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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the interaction of two disciplinary mechanisms: compe­
tition and reputation. We first study a dynamic model of monopolistic competition 
with experienced goods (i.e., quality is observed after goods are purchased). When 
market power is high enough, reputation results in the equilibrium with perfect in­
formation being sustainable. If consumers’ expectations satisfy a weak regularity 
condition, then there is a unique sequential equilibrium with quality goods being 
produced and the price has a mark-up which is either the full information monop­
olistic mark-up or, if this is not sustainable (e.g., when goods are very close substi­
tutes), the rate of time preference, that acts as a reputation constraint. A variation 
of the model allows us to study the private provision of currencies. In particular, 
we inquire whether Bertrand competition between profit maximizing currency is­
suers would drive inflation rates to the efficient outcome, as suggested prominently 
by Hayek. We show that, unless firms can commit to future actions, the efficient 
outcome is never attained. Without full commitment, equilibria with deflation -as 
implied by the Friedman rule- can not be sustained, however, if currencies are close 
substitutes (and beliefs regular) the equilibrium inflation rate is zero.
W e w ant to  th a n k  M assim o M o tta  and  P ierp ao lo  B a tt ig a lli  fo r  th e ir  co m m en ts a s  w ell as p a r tic ip a n ts  in th e  
1998 N orth w estern  U n ive rsity  Su m m e r W orkshop in M a croecon om ic Th eory.
^ R . M arim o n , E u ro p ea n  U n iv e rs ity  In s titu te , U n iv e rs ita t Pom peu F a b ra , N B E R  and C E P R ; J .P .  N ico lin i, U ni- 
























































































































































































1 In tro d u ctio n
Can currency be efficiently provided by competitive markets? As we show 
in this paper, such a m acro  question has a very similar m icro formulation: 
can experienced goods (i.e., goods where quality is observed after being 
purchased) of high quality be provided by competitive markets? In this 
paper, we study a dynamic monopolistic equilibrium model to provide 
an answer to the m icro question. A variation of the model allow us to 
answer the original m acro  question. Both questions address the more 
general theme of how the reputation and the competitive mechanisms 
interact. This is the central theme of the paper.
In monetary theory, the standard laissez-faire view -as, for exam­
ple, has been expressed by Havek- is based on a “Bertrand competition” 
argument, according to which competition will drive the price (return) 
of money to its marginal cost. Given the real rate of interest, and ab­
stracting from legal restrictions or acceptability issues, the demand for 
a given currency depends on its real return. Therefore, a competitive 
issuer will try to undercut competitors with a lower inflation rate. If the 
marginal cost of producing currency is zero, this process of competition 
should make the inflation rate equal to the symmetric of the real rate of 
interest. That is, an “optimal monetary policy” of zero nominal interest 
rates should be the result of competition.
There is, however, one major flaw in this “Bertrand competition” 
argument, when applied to fiat money. When suppliers of currency can­
not commit to their future actions, then competition may lose its bite. 
The reason being that, while currencies compete on their promised rates 
of return, once agents hold a particular currency there may be an incen­
tive for the issuer to inflate the price of goods in terms of this currency, 
reducing, in this way, the outstanding liabilities. This problem, notice, 
is at the root of the time inconsistency problem in monetary theory. 
Current currency portfolios have been pre-specifled, while there is full 
flexibility to choose tomorrow’s portfolios. Currencies compete for to­
morrow portfolios. Thus, Bertrand competition drives prom ised  rates of 



























































































That is. tho currency supplier has an incentive to default on the promise 
made while competing with other currencies. In other words, when the 
choices are sequential, currencies are no longer perfect substitutes: in a 
sense, they are not substitutes at all!
In the industrial organization theory, competition in experienced 
good markets has similar properties. ‘'Bertrand competition" can only 
affect market prices, but not the qualities which are observed cx-post. 
Firms have an incentive to “fly-by-night" providing low quality prod­
ucts. This problem, notice, is at the root of the “market for lemons" 
problem in industrial organization theory. In summary, in a monopolis­
tic competition context, even if goods are close substitutes, competition 
does not discipline firms.
In a dynamic economy, however, firms are concerned for their fu­
ture market position and such reputation mechanism may be enough to 
discipline firms to provide high quality goods. Similarly, the reputation 
mechanism may resolve the time inconsistency problem in the supply of 
money: concern for the future circulation of money may disincentive cur­
rency issuers to create unexpected inflations. Nevertheless, reputational 
concerns exist as long as firms, monopolistic firms in one contest and 
currency suppliers in the other, expect high enough future profits as to 
refrain from capturing the short-term profits. Therefore, competition, 
driving down profits, may enhance efficiency, but may also destroy the 
disciplinary properties of the reputation mechanism. The analysis of this 
trade-off is the central contribution of this paper.
In studying monopolistic competition we first consider the case of 
perfect observability where, as the well understood theory predicts, equi­
librium is uniquely determined by the degree of substitution and, as 
goods become closer substitutes, equilibria become more efficient, achiev­
ing Pareto efficiency in the limiting case of perfect substitution. However, 
when quality is only observed with a lag the mark-up must be bounded 
away from zero as to guarantee enough future profits for reputation to 
play a role. The rate of time preferences -as indicator of the observability 
lag- defines the lower bound on mark-ups. More precisely, we first show 




























































































stationary sequential equilibrium  (and as a sustainable equilibrium). This 
also means that competition does not play any role since, for example, 
any arbitrary large price can be an equilibrium price, sustained by beliefs 
that price deviations, from such a high price, signal low quality. That is. 
arbitrariness of beliefs results in arbitrary price equilibria.
We then constraint beliefs to satisfy two weak regularity conditions 
which are consistent with most learning procedures. In other words, we 
constraint rational expectations equilibria to be leam able  in the sense of 
being supported by beliefs that satisfy minimum regularity conditions, 
such as a weak forms of continuity and monotonicity. We introduce this 
way, the concept of regular sequential equilibrium , which is distinct from 
other existing refinements and can be of interest in other applications. 
In contrast with sequential equilibria, there is a unique stationary regu­
lar sequential equilibrium, in which competition plays a crucial role. In 
particular, the mark-up is either the mark-up of the monopolistic com­
petition with perfect observability or, if goods are too close substitutes 
as such a price not being sustainable, the -lower bound- rate of time 
preferences.
Our model of currency competition is one where goods are sup­
plied in perfectly competitive markets, but consumers, who would like 
to consume all goods, must pay for each good with a specific currency, 
that is, they face multiple (a continuum) of cash-in-advance, constraints 
(as in Woodford 1990). Each currency is supplied by a profit maximizer 
provider, therefore currency competition place the role W  monopolistic 
competition in the original model. The parallel with the case of per­
fect observability is the case with full commitment. Currency competi­
tion achieves the efficient (Friedman rule) monetary equilibrium if cur­
rencies become perfect substitute, as Hayek had envisioned. However, 
the parallel with the case of unobservable quality is the case without 
full commitment. Both cases share the property that competition is on 
announced prices (interest rates), while consumers base their demands 
on expectations on whether such announcements will be realized. The 
equivalent of the lower bound on mark-ups is a non-negative inflation 




























































































in the monopolistic competition model, there is a large set of sequen­
tial equilibria, which shrinks to a unique equilibrium when beliefs satisfy 
regularity conditions. In particular, the unique stationary regular sequen­
tial equilibrium  is characterized by an inflation that it is either zero or 
the inflation of the full commitment equilibrium, if such inflation rate is 
positive. It follows, for example, that the efficient (Friedman rule) mon­
etary equilibrium can not be sustained as Hayek had envisioned. It also 
follows, however, that, with rent maximizing currency providers, compe­
tition enhances efficiency, contradicting some of the arguments of those 
advocating that “money is a natural monopoly”.
Although we exploit the similarities between experienced goods and 
monies, such analogy should not be pushed too far. For example, there is 
a “coordination problem” associated with the “acceptance of fiat money,” 
which is more similar to “coordination problems” associated with some 
products, such as “fashion goods” . In contrast with the industrial orga­
nization literature, in monetary theory often the argument for “money as 
a natural monopoly” has been made based on the existence of such a “co­
ordination problem”. In this paper we will not address such endogeneity 
problems. We will, however, take into account another differential fea­
ture of fiat money: the fact that if people do not expect that a currency 
will be held in the future, then their current demand for such a currency 
is zero. In this regard money is more like a non-perishable durable good 
that requires good maintenance for life. That is, it is enough that you 
do not expect to find service (of quality) in the future for you not to buy 
-say, a car of a certain maker- even if current quality (both of the car 
and the service) is the appropriate one.
Our work is related to different strands of literature. With respect 
to the industrial organization literature on experience goods, our work is 
closely related to Shapiro (1983)1. He considers a similar model of mo­
nopolistic competition in which consumers’ expectations regarding qual­
ity follow an ad-hoc exogenous process. He does not study the trade-offs 
between “competition and reputation” . In contrast, we consider rational 
expectations about quality and, as we have said, our central theme is the *





























































































The issue of currency competition has been the subject of an ex­
tensive academic debate. This debate has seen many supporters of free 
competition making an exception when it comes to money (as Friedman. 
1960), while advocates of free currency competition (notably, Hayekl974 
and 1978, and Rockoff, 1975) have been somewhat isolated . Although, 
the recent reappraisal of the self-regulating properties of free banking2, 
has raised new interest on the study of currency competition. Woodford 
(1990) studies currency competition in a model similar to the one studied 
here. He is interested in studying the stability of exchange rates and does 
not consider reputational issues.
The problem of the time-inconsistency o f  m onetary  policies has 
been extensively studied (see, for example, Chang (1998), Chari k  Ke- 
hoe (1990), Ireland (1994), Stokey, 1991), but with the partial excep­
tion of Taub (1985), the “currency competition” argument has not been 
considered3. Taub (1985) studies two commitment regimes: one with 
full commitment with non-stationary ( “time-inconsistent”) policies, and 
another in which polices are constrained to be “time-consistent” (station­
ary). He shows that in the commitment case, the Friedman rule emerges 
as the competitive outcome, while in the “time-consistent” case the out­
come is inefficient and. as a result, he argues in favor of the “natural 
monopoly” argument. While we have the same result when there is full 
commitment, our analysis of the “non-commitment case” differs substan­
tially, showing how, and when, competition enhances efficiency. Finally, 
the paper which is closest to this one, is our, Marimon, Nicolini and Teles 
(1998), companion paper on the effects on (the unique) monetary policy 
of competition from electronic money, and other currency substitutes.
2See. for example. Calomiris and Kahn (1996), Dowd (1992), King (1983), Rolnick 
and Weber (1983). Selgin (1987), Selgin (c White (1987), Vaubel (1985), and. more 
generally, White (1993) . See also Schuler (1992), for an account of historical episodes 
of free banking, and Havek (1974.1978). Dowd (1992) and White (1993) for a broad 
perspective on the literature on free banking.




























































































2 A m odel of m onopolistic com p etition  with  
exp erien ced  goods
Our model is a version of the model of monopolistic competition of Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977) with experienced goods. Consider an economy with 
a large number of identical consumers that gain utility form services and 
leisure. The utility functions are
where U is increasing and concave and. without loss of generality, t ?'(n) = 
0, a  is a positive constant, nt is work effort and qt is an index of services
with fj, > 1. y{i)t is the consumption of good i e  [0,1]. Each of the goods 
can be provided with variable quality, q(i)t =  0 or 1.
Time must be devoted to the production of services, according to 
the linear technology
We assume that there is a single monopolist that produces each good. 
Total effort per capita is
Producers have, at any time, the option of producing ’’fake” units 
of the consumption good that are costless to produce. A key assumption 
for the characterization of the equilibria is whether consumers can dis­
tinguish the good quality goods from the bad quality ones before they 
buy them. We proceed to characterize the equilibrium when the services 
obtained with the consumption of the goods are observed before they are 
purchased.
OG
J 2  f t  [£%») -  Qn<] - ( i)




























































































If the quality of the good is public information, there exists a unique equi­
librium in this model economy with monopolistically competitive firms. 
If the quality of the good is public information, there exists a unique equi­
librium in this model economy with monopolistically competitive firms.
In each period t, the consumers choose the number of units of each 
good t to purchase, y(i)t, as well as work effort, n(, in order to maximize 
utility, (1), subject to
2.1 M onopolistic com petition with perfect observ­
ability
00 r1
J2Q t /  (p(i)ty(i)t -  n(i)t
L*'0
di Tit < 0 ,
where n ( i) t are the per-capita profits of firm i, p (i)t is the price of goods 
in units of labor time, the numeraire, and Qt is the price of labor at time 
t. in units of labor at time zero. The demand functions for goods will be 
given by
U'(yt)yt “ {y(i)tq(i)t) * q{i)t y  ap(i)u
for all i and t. When q (i)t =  0, then y(i)t =  0.




The demand functions for services of each of the goods, (2), can then be 
written as




The monopolist of product i chooses the quality and the price to 
maximize profits
OO





























































































Since with q(i)t =  0, y(i)t =  0. and profits will be zero, then the firms will 
provide the high quality, q(i)t =  1. They choose the prices to maximize 
profits (4) subject to the demand functions (3). The problem is static. 
As the demand function has constant price elasticity, the optimal price 
per unit of service of each good will be
must hold in equilibrium.
The unique equilibrium will be characterized by a price which will 
be constant over time and across goods
as equation (5) shows. Therefore, the quantity of services of the goods, 
yt =  y y will be constant and will satisfy the following condition
The value of the parameter y determines the substitutability of the 
goods. The closer is y  to one, the higher is the degree of substitutabil­
ity. Note that when y  is in fact one, the mark-up goes to zero and the 
equilibrium is a perfectly competitive one. On the other hand, as y  gets 
larger, so do the mark-ups. Note that we are not allowing for free entry, 
so profits will indeed be positive except in the limiting case in which 
y =  l.
Thus, there exists a unique equilibrium that is closer to the efficient 
outcome, the closer is the parameter y  to one. Indeed only when y  =  1, 
the marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal rate of transforma­
tion. The increased substitutability between goods increases competition 
and increased competition implies an outcome closer to the efficient one. 
This models thus illustrates in a very clear way the nice properties of 
competition.
p(i)t =  y.
The market clearing condition
P =  /h ( 6)




























































































We now assume that, as with many durable goods, consumers can observe 
the quality of the good -or service- only after purchasing it. This feature 
modifies the model above in very important ways. In particular, note 
that each firm now faces a ‘tim e inconsistency problem”. As is clear 
from the expression for profits (4), in each period t. once the consumers 
have paid the price of the good, p ( i)t , under the expectation that the 
good is of high quality, q(i)t =  1, it is optimal to provide no services, 
q(i)t =  0, and save the costs of production4. Of course, the firms will 
refrain from doing so, if this action can affect future demand, since after 
observing low quality the consumers might choose y(i)t+j — 0, j  >  1. In 
this section, we develop a model of reputation to analyze this problem.
The first thing to notice is that a firm will never announce that it is 
producing low quality services, therefore, a price announcement can be 
understood as a price announcement of a high quality service. Let p (i)t 
denote the announced price by firm t in period t for a good or service, 
supposedly of high quality. Then, the realized price is p (i)t =  p (i)t/q ( i) t .
In other words the announced price is the realized price if, and only if, 
the firm chooses q (i)t =  1. Let ht be the information available to a firm 
at the moment of making their period t decisions. That is, ho =  {0} 
and, for t >  0. ht = {h t-\ ,p (i)t-\, for all i} . More formally, a strategy 
for firm i. is a a {  =  { cr̂ f }. where. a { t(ht) =  (p(i)t, q(i)t) £  -R+ x {0, 1}.
A consumer simply decides how much to work and to purchase of ev­
ery service at current announced prices, given his available informa­
tion, which in period t is (ht,p ( i) t . for all j ) .  In other words, a strat­
egy for a -representative- consumer is a a c =  {cr^}, where, a1(ht,pt) — 
{n t, y(i)t-. for all i}  . Consumers’ decisions, however, are based on their 
current beliefs. Let vi''(ht,p(i)t) denote the belief that, given history 
fq.and price announcement p(i)t the realized price is the announced one,
4This feature has not been unnoticed in the Industrial Organization literature (see 
Shapiro 1983). However, to the best of our knowledge, the problem has not been 
analyzed in the context of fully rational agents.





























































































i.e., p{i)t =  p (i)t■ In other words, the consumer’s attaches a probability 
i :t''(ht,p (i)t)  to hrm i producing with quality q (i)t =  1 if it announces a 
price p(i)t- Notice that we implicitly assume that beliefs about hrm i do 
not depend on other firms’ announcements.
As in Kreps and Wilson (1982)’ Sequential Equilibrium  and as in 
P erfect (Extended) Bayesian  Equilibrium5, consumers’ beliefs must be 
consistent with firms’s strategies. More precisely, we may allow firms 
to make random choices and denote by a { ,l (ht)[ p(i)(] =  Pr{ =
p (i)t} and, similarly, o [ t(ht)[ p ( i) t,p ( i) t] =  P r {a [ t(ht) =  (p(i)f , l ) } .  An 
assessm ents ((u c, vc), (a{)^jis said  to be consistent if for every (t, /»,) and 




We can now define a ” Sequential M onopolistic Competition Equilib­
rium' (SMCE) as an assessm ent f(<rc, vc), (o { )) which is consistent and. 
such that, for every (t, h t)
i. Of(ht.p (i)t) solves the problem of the consumer given his beliefs
V t'(ht,p(i)t).
ii. a { t(h {)  solves the problem of firm i.
iii. The market clearing condition f0 y (i)tq(i)tdi =  nt is satisfied.
’’Sequential Monopolistic Competition Equilibrium” (SMCE) pro­
vides a natural framework to study the interactions between competition 
and reputation6. On the one hand, as long as p is strictly larger than
°In our imperfect information context, our consistency condition satisfies the lim­
iting consistency condition of sequential equilibrium, as well as the consistency con­
dition on relative beliefs of perfect extended Bayesian equilibrium (set’, for example, 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Ch. 8).
6Notice that conditions (1) and (2) correspond to Kreps and Wilson (1982)' Se­




























































































one, the economy exhibits monopolistic power, and as p gets close to 
one, the competition between firms is increased. On the other hand, in 
making quality decisions, firms care about their reputation since quality 
provision has strategic implications.
In what follows, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria in the 
sense that all firms behave the same way so expectations about quality are 
the same for every good. We also make use of the fact that, given beliefs 
regarding quality, v?'(ht,p ( i) t), consumers' optimal decisions are. in fact.
, —— _ — i/(i—/x) ] 1_e
their demands. Given yht,p {i) t ,p ) ,  where p =  f  p(i')t di , and 




y(i)t (Tct'{ht) = d(p(i)t,p; 77)
( r , ) ^
L
(8)
In order to stress the pervasive effects of assuming that the quality 
is only observed with a lag, let us consider an equilibrium where strategies 
do not depend on histories. If current actions of the firms do not affect 
the consumers’ expectations about future quality, then, no matter what 
the price is, it is a dominant strategy for the firms to choose to provide the 
low quality, q(i)t =  0, to save on production costs. If the firm produces 
low quality, then for any price announcement p (i)t if Vt'l (ht,p (i)t) =  0, 
consumer’s expectations are fulfilled* 7. The resulting payoffs are zero and
satisfied, not. in every possible history, but only along histories which -possibly, with
zero probability- could only ocurr along equilibrium paths. Such weaker requirement
corresponds to the cocept of Sustainable Equilibrium of Chari and Kehoe (1990). As
we will see, there is a fairly large set of Sequential Equilibria which are, of course,
Sustainable Equilibria.
7Notice that the corresponding assesment is consistent since it is enough to consider 




























































































since there are no other forms of punishment it follows that this is the 
worst SMCE. More formally,
P ro p o sitio n  1 Consum ers' beliefs vf''(hf) — 0, with their corresponding 
strategies of(/i£) =  (0 ,0 ), fo r  all hct €  H f, and fir m s ’ strategy o { t(h {)  =  
(p (i)t,o ), fo r  any p (i)t > 0. fo r  all i and h {  £ H { define a (low quality) 
SMCE. Furtherm ore, there is no SMCE with lower payoffs fo r  consumers 
and firms.
Incidentally, note that this is the unique SMCE (payoff) in which 
strategies do not depend on histories. In this case no reputation con­
siderations arise8. Note also that this would be the unique outcome if 
firms where anonymous players not accountable for their past quality 
decisions.
The next step is to determine under what conditions the equilibrium 
with perfect observability9, described in the previous section, is a SMCE. 
In order to check this, we follow the literature and consider reversion to 
the worst SMCE strategies.
Consider the outcome
q (i)t =  1 ,p (i)t = P , y(i)t =  Vp'nf  =  Vp
where U'(yp) — ap . We want to find conditions under which this out­
come is supported by the following "revert to low quality” strategies and 
beliefs:
<y{& =  (P fi) ,
<t{ (ht) =  (p, 1), if q{i)„ =  1 for 0 < n < t,
— (p, 0 ) , otherwise.
<rf(h£) =  d(p(t)t,p;en) and having en \  0. However, if we required that firms 
maximize profits along the limiting sequence of assesments, then p (i)t \  0 as e„ \  0. 
That is, only a zero price is can be a Perfect Sequential Competitive Equilibrium 
with low quality. See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a discussion of 
trembling-hand perfection and related concepts.
8In the repeated game literature this outcome is called the outcome of the static 
game.
9In the time consistency literature, this is the commitment outcome. In our model, 




























































































1 and £To°(^o) =  np if P(0o =  P- 
0 and 0q °(/iq) =  0. otherwise
l.and  cro°(^o) ~  np q(0n  =  1.0 < n < t and p (i)t — p  
O.and a c0°(h r0) =  0, otherwise.
given that consumption strategies are given by (8), it follows that
0o’'(ho, P(*)o) =  Vp if p(i)o = P -ao'(h o , p(t)o) =  0 otherwise
<?t\hct , p(i)t) =  vp. if q (i)j =  1.0 < n < t  and p (i)t =  p  
p(i)t) =  0 .otherwise.
Consider first the monopolistic competition outcome with perfect 
observability; that is, p  =  p  and yp =  y. Notice that, if it is sequentially 
rational for firms to produce high quality with probability one, then the 
above strategies correspond to sequentially rational choices, since they 
where optimal choices with perfect observability.
If the firm does indeed deliver the high quality good, then the prof­
its. each period, will be given by II(i) =  (p  — 1 )y and. therefore, the 
present value profits, after high quality is observed all previous periods 
and the current price is p, are given by V (p, 1) =  (p — 1 )y/( 1 — 3). On 
the other hand, if the firm deviates and delivers the low quality good, the 
current profits will be py  and the present value profits, after quality zero 
(i.e.. p(i)t- i =  3c) is observed the last period (or any previous period), 
are V'(p.O) =  0. Thus, the firm chooses not to deviate and produce high 
quality (i.e., q (i)t =  1 is sequentially rational) if
( p -  l)y  +  3V (p , 1)
> py +  3V (p , 0)
that is. if
3 V (p , i)  =  (1 f  3 ) (p  - i ) V > y  (9)
Let 3  =  1/(1 +  p). then the firm will choose not to deviate when
p >  l +  p.
Vo'(h0, p(f)o) =  
vco'(h0, p(i)o) =  
v?'(ht, p(i)t) =  




























































































Notice, furthermore, that the resulting assessment is consistent. Thus, 
we have shown the following proposition
P ro p o sitio n  2 I f  the market, pow er is high enough, so that the mark-up 
is higher than the discount rate, then the perfect inform ation equilibrium 
is a SMCE.
The intuition of the last proposition is clear. Given that the firm 
has the option of making a short run profit by selling low quality goods, 
the equilibrium mark-up must be high enough for the firm not to choose 
to do it. As the equilibrium profits are accrued over time, the discount 
rate matters.
This is the intuition of the Industrial Organization literature on 
unobservable quality, and the first quotations go back to Adam Smith. If 
by reducing the quality the firm can make short run profits, a reputation 
argument can explain why firms decide not to do so. As we have just seen, 
reputation is valuable when firms make positive profits in equilibrium. 
But, as competition gets tighter, i.e., in our model p gets arbitrarily 
close to 1, monopolistic rents disappear and the equilibrium with perfect 
observability may not be sustainable through reputation if discount rate 
is high enough. Nevertheless, the time period can be seen as the time 
that it takes for consumers to observe the quality of the goods. The 
shorter is the information lag, the smaller is the discount rate, and the 
easier to sustain the equilibrium with perfect observability.
So far, we have only shown under which conditions is the perfect 
information equilibrium a SCE. However, it should be noticed that the 
above argument applies to any outcome defined by p  =  p! and yp =  
y'. as long as p' > 1 +  p. In this case, the choices are sequentially 
rational since consumers satisfy their demands at p (i)t =  p(i)t =  p ' , firms 
make non-negative profits and any deviation is punished. In particular, 
a price deviation is instantaneously punished by triggering the beliefs 
that the firm is producing low quality. It follows that a price deviation 





























































































P ro p o sitio n  3 F or any p! >  1 +  p there exists a SM CE where the pu ce  
per unit o f  service is p' and firm s always produce the high quality good.
Note that a particular feature of the equilibria discussed above is 
that all firms must be making positive profits in equilibrium, so that the 
Pareto efficient solution is never attained, as long as p > 0.
This analysis shows how high quality can be maintained through 
reputation, but there is no role for competition. In fact, as consumer 
expectations depend on price and quality history, there are no dimensions 
along which the firms can actually compete. There is a sense in which 
consumers expectations alone determine the whole set of restrictions that 
the firms face, so the actions of a single firm end up by being irrelevant for 
the others. The problem, however, is more with the definition of SMCE 
than with competition. We next discuss this problem, showing that a 
more ’’sensible” definition of equilibrium results in competition playing 
a role.
2 .2 .1  R eg u lar beliefs
The first thing to notice is that in a SMCE consumers’ beliefs may be 
fairly unreasonable. For example, conditional on past history, beliefs can 
be highly discontinuous in current prices, a consumer may have had his 
expectations of high quality always fulfilled in the past and, yet, a price 
announcement trigger a complete distrust. In fact, nothing precludes that 
beliefs could be such that observing high quality were to lead to down 
grading consumers’ expectations of high quality. It seems more natural 
(more consistent with any reasonable learning process) to assume that 
beliefs satisfy some minimal continuity and monotonicity properties. We 
impose a regularity condition on beliefs that takes into account these 
intuitive ideas10.
10To our knowledge, our regularity condition is new and distinct from existing re­
finements. Nevertheless, we are not the first ones to introduce monotonicity conditions 




























































































D efin ition  1 A consum er has £— positive beliefs i f  there exist a e  >  0
such that, fo r  all i, h t,p ( i), vf'l(h t,p (i))  >  e i f  there is no n =  0 ......t — 1
with p {i)n ^  p(i)
D efin ition  2 A consum er has weakly monotone beliefs i f i ’t+i (h t ,p ( i) ,p ( i) / l .p ( i  
Vt''(htlp (i)), fo r  all i, ht , p (i) and p (i) >  p ( i)
D efin ition  3 An e — Regular SMCE is a SM CE where, agents' beliefs 
are e-positive and weakly monotone.
D efin ition  4  A Regular Monopolistic Competition Equilibrium (RM CE) 
is an assessm ent ((crc, vc), (cr/)), such that there is a sequence o f  en- 
Regular SM CE satisfying  ((crc,t>c)n, (a { ) n j  —* ((crc, i>c), (<r/)) as £n \  0.
That is, e-positive beliefs incorporate an element of trust. Con- 
sinners’ beliefs must assign at least e  probability of delivering high qual­
ity, as long as firms have always fulfilled consumer’s expectations. As 
with perfection arguments, we then consider assessments that can be 
limit of equilibrium assessments with such an element of trust. Weakly 
m onotone beliefs have the property that believing the announced price 
will be realized, i.e., p(i)  =  p ( i ) /1, when p(i) is being announced should 
be reinforced after such expectation has been realized in the past. As 
it can be seen, our regularity conditions are fairly weak and reasonable.
They are typically satisfied when beliefs evolve (i.e., are updated) ac­
cording to some learning procedure. For example, Bayesian  updating 
will satisfy weak m onotonicity  if consumers consider that they are ob­
serving a stationary path; as in fact they are in a stationary RMCE. 
Similarly, e-positiveness is satisfied when the learning process starts with 
not degenerated initial beliefs and, again, satisfies minimal monotonicity 
conditions guaranteeing that a forecast of low quality with probability 
one will not be made after only having observed high quality.
To see the role that such regularity conditions can play, consider 
that firms follow a strategy with stationary prices and quality (p, 1), part 




























































































p(i)  >  1 from'then on an maintain high quality. Given that along the 
path price announcements are always realized i  f ( h t , p ( i ) )  >  £„ in a s n- 
RSCE. In this case, firm i will deliver high quality in period t if the 
following incentive condition, equivalent to (9), is satisfied
/ ?£ ^ ( pT o  - 1)2rP f x V "  (v n n+i ( h t , r i ) A m / h P ( i ) ) \ x r ' ) ) ^
n=0 \p(l)/
\P(*)/
where (p (i)/ l,p (i))'+?+1 denotes the sequence of observed prices p (i)m = 
p(i)/ l, m  =  t, .... < +  n and announcements p {i)3 =  p(i), s =  t +  1, t +  
n +  1. That is,
/3(p OO-i ) £  Sr  (t-Sn+i(A .,p(ij, (P W / 1,P(0)!:?+1) ) A  A
n=0
( 10)
However, if beliefs satisfy the weak m onotonicity  condition (10) reduces 
to
p~\p(i) -  1) > 1
or
p(i) > 1 +  p
In other words, firm i will maintain high quality as long as the announced 
price satisfies the mark up reputational condition. It follows that a profit 
maximizing firm will deviate to
p(i) =  m ax{p , 1 +  p) (11)
Therefore, since for any en-RSC E (11) is satisfied, it must also be 
satisfied in a RSCE. Furthermore, the previous argument also shows that 
the worst SC’E is not a RSCE since, given that beliefs are not degenerate 
in period zero, firms always prefer to start offering high quality. Nev­
ertheless, in the zero probability event that low quality is observed, the 




























































































observed our regularity conditions do not place any restriction on be­
liefs. We can now state the main proposition that relates competition 
and reputation.
P ro p o sitio n  4 There is a unique stationary  Regular Monopolistic Com­
petition Equilibrium (RM CE), which is characterized by the production o f  
high quality services being sold at a per unit price o f  p' = max {p . 1 + p) .
Notice that, by making very weak assumptions on beliefs, we have 
obtained very strong results. With competition and reputation, there 
is a unique stationary equilibrium where the mark up is the maximum 
between the mark up of the competitive equilibrium with perfect observ­
ability and the interest rate. As we noticed before, it follows that the 
RMCE can not be efficient (even if p  \  1) as long as p >  0.
3 A m odel of cu rren cy  com p etition
In this section we modify the model described above to introduce com­
petition between profit maximizing currency issuers. Our aim is to 
show how competition and reputation interact in the private provision of 
money and, in particular, if it can be an efficient monetary arrangement.
As in the monopolistic model, there is a continuum of goods or 
services and consumers’ preferences are given by YnLoP* (C('lIt) — rvnt], 
where as U satisfies the same monotonicity and concavity assumptions 
and y, =  [/J t/(i)<1/Mdi]'Jwith p > 1. In contrast with the monopolistic 
model, we allow for free entry in the production of each of the goods. 
That is, product markets are competitive and. since the technology is 
linear in labor, firms will make zero profits in equilibrium. It follows that 
all goods or services have a per unit price of one and that the real wage 
will be constant and equal to one.
The central characteristic of our model of currency competition is 




























































































issue its own distinct currency, and each specific currency being needed 
to purchase a corresponding specific good. More precisely, we impose 
a money-specific cash-in-advance constraint on each good. To simplify, 
we will denote by currency i the currency needed to purchase good i. 
It follows that as p approaches one currency substitution increases. In 
particular, currencies are perfectly substitutable in the limiting case of p 
=  1. We assume that currency issuers take into account the demands for 
their currencies, taking real interest rates as given. We also assume that 
they are owned by households.







+ y(i)t di < nt +  6t( 1 +  rt) +  f  — . — di + IT Jo P(i)t
where P(i)t is the price of good i in units of money i, IT(z)t are the current 
profits of the provider of currency i, H, =  /„* 6(+1 are real bonds
measured in units of the composite good, and r t is the real interest rate.
The cash-in-advance constraints are
P(i)ty(i)t < M(i)t
for all i and t.
It follows that the demand for good i in period t is given by
u'{yt)yt“ y(i)t“ = a R (i)t  (12)
where R(i)t is the gross nominal interest rate
R(i)t =  (1 +  rt)(l + 7t (i)t)
and 7r(i)( is the -currency i- inflation rate between period t — 1 and 
t. Furthermore, given that utility is linear in leisure, equilibrium real 




























































































The demand for good i, can be written as





R, f  R(i)'tn ~■I o ‘di i-a
As long as the cash-in-advance constraints are binding, (13) results in a 
demand for currency i
m (i)t =  m t
Rt
R(i)t_ (14)
where m t =  [./o  ̂di.
The issuer of currency i faces an intertemporal budget constraint 
given by
M  (i) ( + i +  d(i]
P (i)t ' P (i)t
where d(i)t is the debt of the i-currency issuer at time t. in units of 
the consumption good, and n(i)t are the profits of the money issuer in 
units of the consumption good. It also faces the corresponding non-Ponzi 
constraints guaranteeing that the present value budget constraint is well 
defined. For simplicity we will assume that d(i)o =  0 for all i. The present 
value of profits are
+  d(t)t(i +  p ) + n(t)
E W ), = $>((*(*)« - l)m(Ot) - (15)
t=0 (=1 1 (l )o
where m (i)t =
In order to maximize the present value of profits, firms must choose 
7r(i)( to maximize
(R(i)t -  I)m (i) ,
taking r t =  p  and (14) as given. They must also minimize No­
tice that, as in standard (single currency) monetary models, a monetary 
policy for the i-currency issuer consists on a current price level and a 




























































































3.1 C urrency com petition with full com m itm ent
We now assume that currency issuers can fully commit to a monetary 
policy. That is, once they announce a policy, (P(i)o- they
implement it. We now characterize the corresponding monetary equilib­
rium
Regarding monetary policies, optimality requires the initial price 
level to be arbitrarily high such that the real value of initial outstanding 
money holdings (liabilities) become zero. This is achieved through 
a big open market operation in which the currency is sold back to the con­
sumers. Each currency issuer takes a negative position in bond holdings, 
in an amount equal to the real quantity of money. In subsequent periods, 
the currency issuer collects the real rate of interest on these bond hold­
ings, as well as the inflation rate on real money holdings, corresponding 
to future money issuing..
To characterize the problem of maximizing time t profits, notice 
that to maximize
(R(i)t ~  1 )m (i) t
subject to (14), results in the choice
R(i)t =  p
This is not surprising, since this maximization problem is the same, in 
the monopolistic competition model, as that of maximizing (4) subject 
to (3). We only need to identify the gross nominal interest rate, in the 
currency competition model, R(i)t with the price p (i)t in the monopolistic 
competition model, and m (i)t with y(i)t- As in the previous model, with 
these prices, the consumption of the goods, y =  rn, is constant and 
satisfies U'(y) =  a p .
It follows that, as currency substitution increases, i.e., p  \  1, nom­
inal interest rates tend to zero, i.e., (R (i)t — 1) \  0, which is supported 
by a deflationary monetary policy, i.e., 7r(i)t \  (/? — 1). In other words, 
with perfect substitution of private currencies the monetary equilibrium 




























































































commitment, Hayek's conjecture, that efficient monetary equilibria c an 
be achieved through currency competition, is satisfied.
Nevertheless, as in standard (single currency) monetary models, the 
full commitment monetary policy is time inconsistent. This can easily 
be seen by considering how the budget constraints of a currency issuer 
evolves over time. At time t, the budget constraint is
Thus, if given the option to change plans at time t ,which we rule out 
when assuming full commitment, the currency issuer will find it optimal 
to expand the money supply and let P (i)t  increase without bound. The 
reason is that the real money demand is decreasing in the nominal interest 
rates, i.e., in expected future prices. However, once consumers have 
made their currency decisions, they are stuck with the outstanding money 
holdings and the nominal money demand is rigid with respect to the 
realized price. We turn now to analyze the case that full commitment 
can not be granted.
3.2 C urrency com petition without full com m itm ent
As there is a parallel between monopolistic competition with perfect 
observability and currency competition with full commitment, there is 
a parallel between monopolistic competition with unobservable quality 
and currency competition without full commitment. More specifically, 
in both models firms compete is in an announced price, in the monop­
olistic competition model it is the price of the good or service, in the 
currency competition model is the nominal interest rate, or the inflation 
rate. With perfect observability in the first model and with full com­
mitment in the second, realized prices must coincide with the announced 
prices. W ith unobservable quality in the first model and lack of commit­
ment in the second, realized prices may differ from the announced ones. 
In fact, in such a case, firms maximize short run profits by setting an
OC oc
£  33~ *n(i)j =  Y . ( W ) i  - 1  )m(i)>) -




























































































arbitrarily large realized price, which in the quality model corresponds 
to choosing low quality and in the currency model to inflate away cur­
rent money holdings (i.e., in making “the quality of outstanding money" 
arbitrarily low). In both models, the timing is very important11: con­
sumers purchase services before they observe the quality they yield, in 
one, and they purchase monies before they observe the return they yield, 
in the other; in both models, consumers must form their expectations on 
realized prices, based on past information and current announcements, 
and. in both models, reputation is what may prevent firms from “flying- 
by-night.”
More formally, while monopolistic firms sequentially choose (p(i)t. q(i)t') 
(p(i)t, i currency issuers sequentially choose ^R (i)(+1, j  , where.
in period t, R  (i)t+1is the announced gross nominal interest rate and R (i)t 
the realized, or ex-post, rate. Given that R(i)t =  ( l+ p ) ( l  +  7r(j)t), we can 
equivalently say that currency issuers choose ^(1 +  7r(i)(+1), J  . In
fact, given the last period announcement (1 -I- n (i)t) =  and the -
within the period- observed P (i)t, we can say that currency issuers choose 
^R(i)t+j ,  -pjjy' j  ■ The difference of timing between the two models corre­
sponds to the fact that in the first model competition is on announced 
current -period t- prices, while in the second on announced -between 
period t and t +  1- interest rates.
We can now define a “Sequential Currency Com petition Equilib­
rium!' (SCCE) in a similar fashion as we have defined SMCE in the mo­
nopolistic competition model. Histories are given by fio =  {/J(Y)o, for all i)  
and, for t >  1, ht =  R (i)t, for all i } ;  i-currency issuer strategy
a c{{h t, R (i)t+l) =  {n (, y(i)t, M (i)t+u for all i , &t+i} based on their beliefs 
Vt''(ht, R (i) t+j) ,  which denote the assessed probability that, given his­
tory, ht,realized nominal interest rates are as announced, i.e., R {i)t+\ =
11 In a paper that also addresses the issue of competition in a time inconsistency 
setting. Kehoe(1989) used a different timing and that is why he obtains the result 
that Bertrand competition does lead to the efficient outcome.




























































































R(i)t+1. A SCCE is an assessm ent ((a c. i/). (a{)  j  which is consistent ami. 
such that, for every (t .h t ), cr{t(ht) solves the maximization problem of 
the /-currency issuer: a rt (ht. R(i)t+]) solves the consumer's problem given 
his beliefs R(i)t+i), and all markets clear, including the perfectly
competitive goods markets. As with SMCE, there is a worst SCCE in 
which currencies are not held, since agents expect realized nominal in­
terest rates to be arbitrarily large.
To see more explicitly how currency competition and reputation 
interact, consider the problem of whether a stationary gross nominal 
interest rate, R(i),  is sustainable as a SCCE. Suppose that the /-currency 
issuer considers a deviation in period t, from the announced R(i)t by 
printing arbitrarily large amounts of money, i.e., sets =  0. As the 
issuer deviates, the agents expectations become vf+s(ht+s, i?(i)f+1+s) =  0. 
s >  0. Thus, the demand for currency i becomes zero from time t on. 
i.e., m(i)t+s =  0, s >  1, which means that the newly issued pieces of 
paper are worthless. In fact, the value of the outcome after the deviation 
is zero, but for the value of the outstanding real debt. The reason is 
that the deviation triggers a currency collapse for that currency, starting 
tomorrow. But, contrary to the monopolistic competition model with 
unobserved quality, the demand for money, being an asset, depends on 
future prices. Thus, the expectations of the currency collapse make the 
newly injected money be worthless today. Therefore, the present value of 
the benefits following a deviation are obtained by replacing the real value 
of money stocks from time t on by zeroes in the expression for profits 
(??)
V D(i)t =
On the other hand, if the issuer does not deviate, the present value 
of the profits are
J R { i )  -  l)m(i) _  M(i), _  d(i)t 
‘  1 - / 3  P(i), 3




























































































The last equality follows from the fact that, in equilibrium. m (i) =  .
It follows that, the «-currency issuer will chose not to deviate from the 
stated policy when
[ p - W )  -  l )  - 1] > 0 
i.e .,R (i)  > 1 + p
or, equivalently, whenever 7r(i) > 0. Notice that, under such stationary 
profits are given by II(i)t =  (R (i) — l)m (i), for t > 1, while, by the present 
value constraint (15) Il(i)o =  — . That is, given initial money hold­
ings, M (i)o, profit maximization requires pJ— =  0. As in the previous 
model, the set of stationary SCCE is fairly large, although, given a sta­
tionary monetary policy ( 'p ^ i 7r(*))> >-e-- Æ(»)t =  ( l+ p )( l+ 7 r ( i) ) , t > 0, 
the SCCE allocation is uniquely defined. More formally, the following 
proposition parallels Proposition 3,
P ro p o sitio n  5 F or any n(i) >  0, the policy  (0, n (i)) can be supported 
as strategy o f  a stationary symm etric SCCE.
The reason why zero inflation is important is because of the timing 
of collection of revenues for the issuers. Remember that along the com­
mitment solution, the issuers make initial money holdings be valueless 
and, by an open market operation they sell back the new money balances 
to the consumers. Thus, at the first period the issuers hold positive assets 
in an amount equal to the retil balances. Prom those assets they collect 
the real rate of interest, p. Thereafter, they also collect the inflation rate 
times the real money balances every period. If they deviate, they will 
keep the real asset holdings only12. Thus, as long as the returns they 
make with the inflation tax are non-negative, they have no incentives to 
deviate.
12Note that if the issuer were forced to hold their own currency denominated assets, 




























































































3 .2 .1  R eg u lar beliefs
As in Section 2, we can restrict the set of SCCE, and allow for competition 
to play its role, by assuming that beliefs satisfy the regularity conditions. 
Weak m onotonicity  and e — positive beliefs can be similarly defined by 
replacing p ( i) by R (i)  and p ( i ) /1 by R ii)  =  R (i) (resp. p(i)  /  p(i) by 
R (i) /  R (i))- Then, the parallel of Proposition 4 is
P ro p o sitio n  6 There is a unique stationary  Regular Currency Compe­
tition Equilibrium (R C C E), which is characterized by the inflation rate 
7r(i) =  max {p  — (1 +  p), 0 } and the initial price l /P ( i ) o  =  0.
It follows that, without full commitment, when privately issued 
currencies are very close substitutes inflation is zero and the nominal 
interest rate p. That is, the monetary equilibrium is not efficient and 
the Friedman rule is not implemented. In summary, without full com­
mitment, Hayek’s conjecture, that efficient monetary equilibria can be 
achieved through currency competition, is not satisfied.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to clarify three related -but distinct- issues. 
First, how competition and reputation interact when, on the one hand, 
firms are subject to competition, but, on the other hand, such competitive 
pressure does apply to all their decisions. These decisions, nevertheless, 
may be subject to reputational pressures. Second, we have seen how in 
this general context two -apparently, very different- economic problems 
share the same basic features: monopolistic competition with experienced 
goods and currency competition. Third, we have seen that sequential (or 
sustainable) equilibria may not have much predictable power, and mis­
represent the role of competition, in reputational models, but that im­
posing a weak regularity condition on beliefs results in equilibria, where 




























































































it is within the nature of the reputational mechanism that competitive 
pressures can not achieve full efficiency. A particular corollary of these 
results is that Hayek conjecture, that efficient monetary equilibria can be 
achieved through currency competition, is not satisfied if currency sup­
pliers make sequential decisions. Any of these three issues explored here 
suggest further work. In particular, alternative forms to model currency 
competition may be more suitable to relate our results with historical 
experiences. We leave this for future research.
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